It should be said at the outset that accurate diagnostic appraisal of closed head injuries can be very difficult. In open or penetrating head wounds with obvious neurological sequels there is not too much difficulty in establishing the fact that brain injury has occurred. It may also be relatively easier to assess its extent. The after-effects seen in a large series of such patients have recently been analysed by Lishman (1968) . Apart from focal neurological defects, he observed four main categories of psychiatric symptoms -intellectual deficit, affective disorders, disorders of behaviour and somatic complaints having no obvious physical basis. There appeared to be an association between intellectual deterioration and damage to the temporal and paiietal lobes particularly of the left hemisphere. Behavioural disorders occurred more frequently following frontal lobe damage or in association with the so-called frontal lobe syndrome which may of course reflect focal damage elsewhere. Such disorders together with affective and somatic complaints were found to be more frequent after damage of the right cerebral hemisphere. Apart from this the relationship between affective disorders and the degree or site of brain damage showed very little correlation and in the case of somatic complaints without physical foundation, those usually grouped under the heading 'posttraumatic' syndrome, none at all.
It would seem reasonable to try to apply some of Lishman's findings to closed head injury cases where, as has already been suggested, diagnosis can be a much more difficult exercise. Certainly all the same kinds of psychiatric symptoms may be observed. Focal neurological damage and physical sequele, other than those which constitute the post-traumatic syndrome, are, however, much' less frequent and indeed may be only transient. Where there is no history of head injury, making a diagnosis of brain damage can be very difficult indeed. This is a matter which often gives rise to arguments among psychiatrists, particularly among those who deal with disturbed children whose difficult behaviour might conceivably be the result of brain damage at birth rather than due to psychological causes.
Often it seems as if this is no more than a kind of guessing game, the direction of the guess being in large part determined by the particular bias of the guesser. But extraordinary mistakes can be made. Case 1 A 30-year-old single man was referred for assessment. He was the eldest son of two schoolteachers and had one brother at university. The patient's scholastic record was poor and disjointed and on leaving school his work record followed the same pattern. At the age of 16 he was referred to a neurologist who carried out a few investigations but Section ofNeurology decided there was no evidence of organic disease. During the next twelve years he came on separate occasions under the care of 4 psychiatrists. The first thought he was probably schizophrenic and gave him ECT. The second made a diagnosis of recurrent depression in a highly self-critical personality and referred him to a rehabilitation unit who in turn diagnosed him as suffering from an anxiety state with some obsessional features. The third psychiatrist labelled him as 'schizo-affective' and prescribed chlorpromazine and attendance at a day hospital. The fourth psychiatrist, who finally referred the patient to me, regarded him as suffering from an inadequate personality together with anxiety-proneness, emotional immaturity and less than average intelligence. In some ways he was nearer to the true diagnosis than any of the others.
The first thing which came to light was that on detailed psychological testing his full scale IQ (WAIS) was 83 with a verbal scale of 99 and performance 63. This discrepancy which is statistically significant (P<0 05) strongly suggested brain damage. A pneumoencephalogram showed quite marked ventricular dilatation and an appearance consistent with arrested internal hydrocephalus.
There are clearly two important aspects to this story. The fact that he had brain damage was missed because proper investigations were not carried out in the first place. Secondly, once the correct diagnosis was made his parents were not only relieved of feelings of guilt which they entertained in that they had felt that they might have failed in some way in their son's upbringing, but also once they knew the real cause of his social and occupational disability, they became much more realistic in their attitude towards him and able for the first time to accept that he could only perform at a limited level however hard he tried. This made rehabilitation much easier.
In investigating those who suffer brain damage following closed head injury, it should be stressed that the tools we have to hand are as yet on the whole relatively inefficient. If a pneumoencephalogram shows a marked degree of ventricular dilatation indicating gross cerebral atrophy, this really tells us very little more than can be probably determined by clinical observation. The fact that such a patient is grossly demented is therefore only of academic interest. Much the same would seem to be applicable to EEG recordings which in less severe cases, i.e. those having the best potentials for rehabilitation, are so often those in which the findings tend to be equivocal. Even more disappointing in a way are the results of psychological tests from which one might with some justification hope for a demonstration of intellectual impairment other than that which is particularly severe and which can usually be easily assessed clinically. However, in fairness to the psychologist it must be said that he is often at a disadvantage in having no accurate record available of a brain-injured patient's level of intellectual functioning prior to injury. There are exceptions, however, where, even if no accurate pre-morbid assessment of intelligence is available, a certain level of functioning can be assumed:
Case 2 A final-year medical student, aged 23, was involved in a car accident. He was in the front passenger seat. A collision occurred, killing the driver and causing the patient to be thrown out of the car head first. He remained in coma for 48 hours during which there was some suspicion of a transient left hemiparesis but no other neurological signs. On recovery he became markedly delirious, noisy and difficult to control, this state alternating with an amnesic-confabulatory syndrome lasting for eight weeks.
His first full psychological assessment was carried out six months after the injury. His IQ was then assessed on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale as 100, this figure, judging from his previous academic record, probably being about 30 points lower than before the accident. The difference between his verbal scale IQ (111) and performance scale (85) was almost significant at the 1 % level, which of course was very suggestive of brain injury. He was obviously unfit to continue with his studies and was therefore advised to seek a relatively simple clerical job for the time being. Six months later his full scale IQ had risen to 111 with the same discrepancy between verbal and performance levels. During the next year a further rise occurred until, eighteen months after the accident, his IQ reached 122. It was then considered that he might be allowed to resume his medical studies. He repeated his final year but 2j years after the accident he only obtained a bare pass in medicine and failed all other subjects. He was advised not to re-sit until a year later. He did rather better then, but was not completely successful. (Miller & Stern 1965 , Phillips 1967 Other than frank brain damage leading to dementia which may be permanent, severe postconcussive 'functional' psychoses of other kinds appear to be rare (Wechsler 1935 , Lewis 1942 though any type of mental disorder can be precipitated by head injury. What occurs depends presumably on the patient's predisposition which of course is determined by factors quite separate from the nature of the injury itself. Much more common than a frank psychosis is a post-concussive neurotic syndrome in which, as has been pointed out by Miller (1961) his wife both reported a considerable deterioration in his work and general behaviour. His concentration was said to be poor, he brooked no criticism, became easily fatigued and had a much lessened tolerance for alcohol. He frequently absented himself from work without good reason and although there was no clear evidence of his having had any definite epileptic attacks (his EEG showed no abnormality whatsoever) he not infrequently suffered from what seemed to be hysterical fugue states and found himself on several occasions in different towns without any clear idea of how he had got there.
On examination he proved to be garrulous and circumstantial and showed a degree -of fatuous euphoria, sometimes referred to as 'Witzelsucht'. Despite this he was not without some insight into his difficulties. Psychological testing showed no intellectual impairment, his full-scale IQ (WAIS) being 121 with no significant discrepancy between verbal and performance scales. Careful neurological examination revealed right partial III cranial nerve weakness and a very slight upper motor neurone lesion of the VII nerve. Despite a previously negative report, a fresh skull X-ray showed a clearly visible fracture line over the right frontal region. A pneumoencephalogram showed enlargement of the anterior horn of the right lateral ventricle as compared to the left. It was concluded, therefore, that his personality change was due to right frontal lobe atrophy. He was treated with chlordiazepoxide which controlled some of the more awkward features of his behaviour. His employers, who were sympathetic, being informed via their medical department of the true nature of his disability, were able to find him a job entailing less responsibility than that which he had previously had and with which he could not cope. Although still needing surveillance he has remained at work and his behaviour has somewhat improved.
This case illustrates very clearly that it is not necessarily impairment of intellectual function which may lead to trouble following head injury. Organically determined emotional factors may be just as important and in any rehabilitation programme allowance for these must be made.
Why, although the patient was clearly brain injured, was all this not discovered before? As already stated, undue interest seems to have been given to his broken legs rather than to his broken head. What, however, might clearly have indicated the likelihood of some brain damage occurring was the long period of clouded consciousness together with amnesia. As Ritchie Russell (1964) has pointed out, there is a remarkable correlation between the duration of disturbed consciousness and the severity of brain damage. 
